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## RECENT SOVIET MOVES IN THE COMMUNIST WORLD

- I. The Khrushchev-Tito secret meeting in Rumania on 1 and 2 August represents the most significant Soviet foreign policy move since the Presidium shake-up late last June.
  - A. Khrushchev moved with remarkable speed after his announcement at the time of the purge that Molotov had been responsible for the deterioration in Soviet-Yugoslav relations. He held ideological talks with Yugoslav leaders Kardelj and Rankovic in Moscow in mid-July, removed the freeze on Soviet credits to Yugoslavia in late July, sent a working level Soviet party delegation to Belgrade at the end of the month, and, finally, met with Tito in Rumania.

B. Khrushchev may also be ready to pressure both Albania and Bulgaria--Tito's two prime Satellite enemies--into an accomodation with Tito.

II. The Rumanian meeting apparently restores Moscow-Belgrade relations to a status comparable to that achieved at the time of Tito's Moscow visit in June 1956. The meeting, as a matter of fact, specifically reaffirmed the joint declaration issued by the two leaders at the time of last year's visit.

A. The Rumanian meeting does not mean that a genuine compromise has been reached, even now. The leaders admit that obstacles remain to be overcome before further rapprochement is possible.

B. Moscow's major goal still seems to be the return of Yugoslavia to the Bloc. (In addition, Khrushchev may feel that accord with Tito will strengthen his own internal position.) Belgrade's goal is

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friendship and 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R00890A000800100018-9 Communist states, with at least long-range aim of using their influence to develop genuinely equal relations between all Communist states (including relations between the USSR and its Satellites).

C. Both sides are now optimistic and desire accord on as many issues as possible. They may be working out another "agreement to disagree," each hoping the other has learned much during the past year and will eventually "see the light."

III. All "liberal" elements in the Satellites--including Gomulka--will be encouraged by the Tito-Khrushchev meeting.

and--unlike the period following the Soviet 20th Party Congress (February 1956)--the USSR has made perfectly clear its position concerning Soviet leadership of the Bloc and the need for party unity within each Satellite. Therefore, existing ferment is not likely in the near future to approach the proportions of last fall on the basis of this kind of Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement.

B. Nagy followers in Hungary--currently under severe regime attack--may have hopes that Tito will abandon his support for Kadar and work for amelioration of their lot. But Tito is unlikely to press for sudden changes and probably still feels that the Kadar regime is the best possible under present circumstances.

IV.

The Khrushchev-Tito talks emphasized, among other things, the "special significance of strengthening the unity of Communist and workers parties" and "progressive forces" throughout the world. This may indicate Yugoslav willingness to join some form of new organization to replace the cominform which became defunct in the spring of 1956.

A. Rumors of such an organization have been persistent for several months.

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1. [REDACTED] Soviet Party presidium member Mikhail Suslov has been setting up a bureau in Prague to coordinate ties between Communist parties and to publish a journal.

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B. Khrushchev's current interest in better relations with Tito  
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probably means that he would tailor any such new organization to  
suit Tito instead of excluding him.

1. Though a pre-war Comintern agent and the first to propose a  
new international workers' body after the war, Tito's experience  
with the latter organization (the Cominform) after its  
founding in 1947 was brief and unhappy. He would therefore  
probably be extremely wary of any Khrushchev proposals for a  
new international Communist organization.
2. This means that a new organization would have to be more  
loosely organized than the Cominform with less centralized  
control, perhaps even open to non-Communist parties and  
leaders from outside the Orbit. This is probably also  
necessary to get Polish and Italian Communist support.

probably publish a journal. The editorial policies of such a journal would certainly be a problem--the USSR would be likely to push a conventional line emphasizing Bloc solidarity and Soviet leadership; the Yugoslavs and some others would like to propagate their own ideas and theories. Perhaps a compromise can be worked out, but whether a compromise and any such loosely organized outfit would serve Moscow's purpose of strengthening unity and discipline remains to be seen.

V. Khrushchev, back in Moscow from Rumania for only a few days, is now in East Germany.

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- A. Bulganin is not being replaced as originally scheduled. This, coupled with recurring reports that his position was weakened during the purge, suggests that Bulganin may well be replaced as Chairman of the Council of Ministers, perhaps at the meeting of the Supreme Soviet due in the next month or so. Mikoyan--who is in Germany now--and Zhukov are the two most likely possibilities as Bulganin's replacement.
- B. The visit to East Germany during the week of 7-13 August is probably intended to demonstrate Soviet approval of this loyal satellite regime and to increase its prestige. Khrushchev may reaffirm his support for East German Party boss Walter Ulbricht.
- C. There are no signs of any softening in Moscow's rigid stand on German reunification, which is based on the insistence that the East and West German regimes settle the problem themselves.



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The Soviet side is expected to announce some "twist," such as a reduction of Soviet forces in Germany, for dramatic effect. But their basic position will probably not change.